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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal from an order of the District Court denying 
a petition to expunge a long-standing criminal r ecord 
presents a question of first impression in this Court 
pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction. The appellant, 
Dennis Dunegan, filed his petition in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on 
December 14, 2000, to expunge the recor d of criminal 
proceedings pertaining to him in that court in 1971-1972. 
The District Court denied Dunegan's petition on the merits, 
stating that Dunegan had failed to allege any extraordinary 
circumstances justifying expungement under the equitable 
powers of the court.1 Dunegan appealed. We will vacate the 
order of the District Court and remand for dismissal for 
want of jurisdiction. 
 
I. 
 
On November 9, 1972, Dennis Dunegan, then a police 
officer, was indicted in the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania for allegedly violating 
a suspect's civil rights. The charges ar ose out of an 
accidental shooting that took place on February 7, 1971. 
Dunegan was tried and acquitted by a criminal jury. Today, 
he is 56 years old, retired from the Penn Hills Police 
Department, and employed as an independent truck driver. 
Dunegan predicates his petition for relief on the inherent 
powers of the court. He cites no applicable federal statute 
providing for the expungement of criminal r ecords in the 
federal judicial system. The inherent powers of the federal 
courts are limited and difficult to define with precision. 
Therefore, "they must be exercised with restraint and 
discretion." Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 
764 (1980). This Court has identified three basic uses of 
inherent power. See Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Dunegan's petition was filed in the same court and under the same 
docket number as his original criminal prosecution in 1972. 
 
                                2 
  
557, 562-64 (3d Cir. 1985). First is the"irreducible 
inherent authority" grounded in separation of powers 
doctrine, "involving activity fundamental to the essence of a 
court" without which the courts would cease to fulfill the 
function for which the Constitution established them. Id. at 
562. The exact limits on this form of the inherent powers 
are nebulous, but it is clear that they do not entail the 
power to assert jurisdiction over petitions for expungement. 
 
The second and most common use of the inherent powers 
encompasses those powers necessary for the courts to 
adjudicate cases in an orderly and efficacious manner. See 
id. at 562-63. The contempt power is "the most prominent" 
of these powers, and has been described as essential to the 
administration of justice and the effective functioning of the 
judiciary. Id. (citations omitted). Jurisdiction over 
expungement petitions is not embraced by this for m of the 
court's inherent powers. 
 
Finally, courts have the authority under their inher ent 
power to employ instruments and persons unconnected 
with the court, such as experts and auditors, to aid them 
in their decision making. See id. at 563. Clearly, this power 
does not provide courts with jurisdiction independently to 
consider petitions for expungement. 
 
II. 
 
Having ruled out the inherent powers of the court as a 
basis for jurisdiction over Dunegan's petition, we now turn 
to the doctrine of "ancillary jurisdiction," which has been 
held, under some circumstances, to supply jurisdiction over 
expungement petitions. See, e.g., United States v. Sumner, 
226 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 538 (2d. Cir . 1977). A federal court 
invokes ancillary jurisdiction as an incident to a matter 
where it has acquired jurisdiction of a case in its entirety 
and, as an incident to the disposition of the primary matter 
properly before it. It may resolve other related matters 
which it could not consider were they independently 
presented. See Wright - Miller- Cooper, Fed. Practices & 
Procedures; Jurisdiction 2d S 3523. Thus, ancillary 
jurisdiction permits a court to only dispose of matters 
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related to the original case before it. See also Sumner, 226 
F.3d at 1013. The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction does not 
give district courts the authority to reopen a closed case 
whenever a related matter subsequently arises. The 
Supreme Court in recent years has held that ancillary 
jurisdiction is much more limited. 
 
In Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 
(1994), the Supreme Court reiterated that federal courts are 
courts of limited jurisdiction. It instructed that"[T]hey 
possess only that power authorized by the Constitution and 
statutes, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree." 
(citation omitted). In Kokkonen, the parties had arrived at a 
court approved settlement agreement and the District Court 
dismissed the case. The Supreme Court held that the 
District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
subsequently to grant a motion to enforce the settlement 
agreement. Because the Order of Dismissal did not reserve 
jurisdiction in the District Court to enforce it, the Supreme 
Court held that the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction did not 
apply. 
 
In analyzing the decisional law on the doctrine of 
ancillary jurisdiction in Kokkonen, Justice Scalia, writing 
for a unanimous Court, concluded that federal courts have 
asserted ancillary jurisdiction for two separate, though 
sometimes related, purposes: "(1) to per mit disposition by a 
single court of claims that are, in varying r espects and 
degrees, factually interdependent; and (2) to enable a court 
to function successfully, that is, to manage its pr oceedings, 
vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees." Id. at 
380. We do not believe that these purposes contemplate a 
petition for the expungement of a criminal r ecord. 
 
In United States v. Noonan, 906 F.2d 952 (3d Cir. 1990), 
this Court reversed the District Court's expungement of 
court records based on a Presidential pardon. The 
petitioner had been convicted of violating the Military 
Service Act. The District Court was called on solely to 
determine a question of law: whether the Pr esidential 
pardon entitled the petitioner to the expunction of the 
record of his conviction. The question of the jurisdiction of 
the court to entertain such a petition in the absence of a 
challenge to the legality of the conviction or arr est was 
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never raised. Today, this Circuit considers and decides that 
question for the first time. 
 
In United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 
2000), the Court of Appeals also faced a motion to expunge 
a criminal record created mor e than a quarter of a century 
before. The petitioner contended, inter alia, that the District 
Court had jurisdiction under its "inherent powers under 
equitable principles" to grant the motion. Citing Kokkonen, 
and In re Hunter, 66 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1995), the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed, 
stating that there must be some statutory or Constitutional 
basis for its jurisdiction to hear the independent action 
before it. Id. at 1010. 
 
As in this case, Sumner did not seek expungement under 
any statute, Rule of Court or under the Constitution. He 
too filed a motion in the District Court under the case 
number assigned to his original offense. In a careful 
analysis of the law, the Court of Appeals noted that a 
district court has the "inherent jurisdiction" within the time 
allowed for appeal to modify its judgment for err or of fact or 
law or even to revoke a judgment. The court also looked at 
Fed. R. App. P.4(b) and observed that the expiration of the 
time to file an appeal under that Rule "is a jurisdictional 
limitation upon the power of the District Court after a 
judgment of conviction has been entered." Id. at 1013. 
Concluding that ancillary jurisdiction of the court is limited 
to a determination of matters incidental to the exercise of 
its primary jurisdiction over a cause under r eview, it 
concluded that expungement of a criminal recor d "solely on 
equitable grounds, such as to rewar d a defendant's 
rehabilitation and commendable post-conviction conduct, 
does not serve any of these goals." Id. at 1014. In its view, 
a district court's ancillary jurisdiction "is limited to 
expunging the record of an unlawful arr est or conviction, or 
to correcting a clerical error." Id. 
 
We need not consider at this time whether a r ecord may 
be expunged on the basis of Constitutional or statutory 
infirmity in the underlying criminal pr oceedings or on the 
basis of an unlawful arrest or conviction. Dunegan has not 
raised any of these concerns; he has not alleged any 
unlawful arrest or other legal infirmity. 
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Thus, we hold that in the absence of any applicable 
statute enacted by Congress, or an allegation that the 
criminal proceedings were invalid or illegal, a District Court 
does not have the jurisdiction to expunge a criminal record, 
even when ending in an acquittal. 
 
III. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The 
order of the District Court will be vacated and the case 
remanded to the District Court with dir ection to dismiss the 
petition for want of jurisdiction. 
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